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Richard  Barichello and  Robert Romain
On  October  3,  1987,  Canada  and  the  United  States  signed  a  Trade  Agreement
(CUSTA) which came into force on January  1, 1989.  Included  in this agreement,  all tariffs
on dairy products which were not on the Import Control  List (ICL) subject to GATT rules
were to be eliminated over ten years.  Products not included on the list at the time of signing
the agreement included ice cream and yogurt.  Canada added these products to the ICL early
in 1988.  A GATT Panel ruled that such action was illegal basically because these processed
products were not considered to be "like products" to raw or liquid milk to which the Article
XI  provisions  of the  GATT  applied,  provisions  that  allowed  import  quotas  if certain
restrictive conditions were met.  Canada refused to withdraw these products  from the ICL,
deferring action on this issue until GATT negotiations were completed.  Canada argued that
GATT Article XI would be made more restrictive,  thus legitimizing  its action.
In  1992, Canada signed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which
involved three bilateral agreements  among the three partners.  The CUSTA was folded into
the NAFTA as the bilateral  agreement  governing  trade between  Canada  and the  United
States.
As a result of  the Uruguay Round Agreement (URA) of  the World Trade Organization
(WTO, formerly  the GATT) signed at the end of 1993, all quota and non-tariff barriers have
to be translated into tariff-equivalents.  In addition, export subsidies  and subsidized volumes
have  to be gradually reduced over a period of 6  years starting August  1, 1995.  Minimum
access commitments are also established.  Tariffs  for specific supply managed products and
processed products manufactured with the raw commodities were proposed by Canada and
were accepted by all parties, including the United States.  It is clear that the tariffs under the
URA  are  very high  and  as  a  consequence,  imports  of dairy  products  and  other  supply
managed  products  will  be  practically  impossible  until  the  next  round  of negotiations.
However, there has arisen  a difference  in opinion  between  Canada and the United States
regarding the application of NAFTA provisions to the tariffs created in the URA.  The United
States seems to argue that Article XI  is no longer in the multilateral Agreement, that Canada
has  signed NAFTA which  extended CUSTA  for agriculture, and therefore  Canada shouldProceedings
eliminate  all tariffs on agricultural products by January  1, 1998 as stipulated by Article 402:2
C  in CUSTA.  The underlying question is whether Uruguay Round Agreement (URA) tariffs
that arose from the tariffication of previous  non-tariff barriers  fall under the disciplines  of the
NAFTA,  or whether they are unaffected  by that Agreement.  A NAFTA  dispute settlement
panel, the first dispute heard under Chapter 20 of the NAFTA, has been convened to resolve
this conflict to determine which trade agreement  takes precedence.
Since  the outcome  of the dispute  will not  be known  until  the end  of June at the
earliest, the objective of this paper is to investigate the medium term implications,  say over
the next five years, of possible outcomes for the Canadian dairy sector.  We will  first discuss
the case where the NAFTA Dispute Panel  rules for the Canadian position.  The alternative
scenario  assumes the U.S. position,  that NAFTA dominates  over URA,  is upheld.  In this
second scenario, we will assume a series of smaller changes, however likely or unlikely they
may  be.  First,  however,  the  next  section  summarizes  the  role  of the  Canadian  Dairy
Commission  (CDC) while the following section presents the recent modifications that have
been  made to  the Canadian  dairy policy  and programs.  These  recent  changes  were not
presented  in  the  introductory  paper  by  Agriculture  and  Agri-Food  Canada,  but they  are
important  in analyzing the short-medium  term evolution of the Canadian dairy sector.
THE CANADIAN  DAIRY  COMMISSION
Role of the Canadian Dairy Commission
The Canadian  Dairy Commission  (CDC) was  established  in  1966  by virtue of the
Canadian  Dairy Commission Act.  The CDC is a crown corporation which administers  the
National  dairy policy and  its two  objectives  outlined  in  the Act are  "to provide efficient
producers of  milk and cream with the opportunity of  obtaining afair  return  for their labour
and investment capital, and to provide consumers of dairy  products with a continuous and
adequate supply of dairy  products of high quality. " (CDC Annual  Report, p. 16).
The Canadian dairy sector has  been under supply management for over twenty five
years.'  The national  plan which established the aggregate national  quota (market sharing
quota MSQ)  for industrial milk was signed in December  1970  by the CDC, the provincial
governments  of Ontario  and  Quebec,  as  well  as  by  producers  representatives  of these
provinces.  The  other provinces  gradually joined  the national  plan  and all  provinces  had
'See  Coffin  et  al  (1994)  and  Gouin  (1987)  for excellent  descriptions  of the origin  and
evolution of the Canadian  supply management  system.
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signed the plan for the dairy year starting April  1st,  19742.  National  quota is allocated to
provinces according to historical market shares.  The provincial quota is distributed among
producers  according  to provincial  legislation  or regulations.  In most provinces,  a public
quota exchange market exists and quotas are traded among producers.
To  administer  the National  Dairy  Policy,  the  CDC  is  responsible  for  setting the
national MSQ which reflects estimated domestic requirements at the going price,  as well as
a small percentage  of domestic  production which is exported to the United Kingdom.  To
assure a "fair" return to producers, the CDC sets a target price for milk, which is partly based
on calculated average costs of production using survey data from Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba
and  New-Brunswick,  and  it  establishes  support  prices  for butter  and  skim  milk  powder
which,  in conjunction with a direct  federal  subsidy, meets the target price.  The CDC stores
butter and skim milk powder in periods of overproduction relative to domestic needs and it
also  exports what is not needed domestically.  Up to August 1995,  the CDC was funding its
operations  through producers  levies  which were  of two main  types:  "within-quota"  and
"over-quota"  levies.  These levies were paid by provincial marketing Boards  and they were
collected from producers  through different means and levels  specific to each province.
Recent Modifications  to the National  Dairy Policy
During the dairy year 1994-1995, sub-committees formed by the CDC worked heavily
to adjust the national dairy policy and programs  so they would be acceptable under the URA.
This included substituting export levies collected  from producers with another mechanism
which would allow surplus production to be exported at world prices, and which would allow
processors and  manufacturers who use dairy constituents  in products that are traded freely
(or almost freely)  on the world market to remain competitive.
A second major adjustment to the dairy policy is the elaboration of  new Plans in the
Offer To Purchase Program (OTPP), which should contribute  to a more efficient allocation
of milk among processors within a province and across provinces.  This modification to the
OTPP is coupled with the implementation of a national quota exchange market which will
start its operations August  1, 1996.
The  third  significant  modification  is  the  implementation  of an  Optional  Export
Program (OEP) in order to take advantage of potential export markets.  Each of the previous
policy changes  are further discussed in the next sub-sections.
From Levies to Special Milk Classes.  Prior to August 1, 1995, the small export program as
well  as  a  few other  programs  administered  by  the CDC,  programs  which  contributed  to
supply dairy constituents to processors who were operating  in an internationally  competitive
environment, were financed with levies imposed on all milk produced within quota (within-
2Newfoundland has never signed the National Plan because dairy  production is almost non-
existent in this province.
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quota  levies).  Exports of dairy products  manufactured  with over-quota  production  were
financed  with  over-quota  levies.  These  levies  were  collected  on  a  per  hectoliter  basis.
Therefore,  the  "costs"  associated  with  the  national  export  program  and  a  few  other
"legitimate"  programs  were shared  among  all producers, while individual  producers  who
exceeded their quota were responsible  for exporting the surplus of dairy products3 (mainly
butter and/or skim milk powder).
In order to  comply to the WTO Agreement,  a new mechanism had to be developed
since levies  can no longer be collected from producers, and milk used for export or in rebate
programs  has  to  be paid the  world price to  producers.  As of August  1, 1995,  provinces
agreed to share a common  classification  for milk into five classes.  The first four classes  are
for milk used to process domestic products  and the pricing of milk in these  classes reflects
domestic requirements  at the  going prices.  Milk used  into exported products or in rebate
programs,  as well as milk produced over-quota  fall into class 5 and  is priced according to
world price.
Since the distribution of industrial milk production  is quite unequal across provinces,4
it was determined  not to be equitable that only producers in provinces with a large  share of
industrial milk quota bear the "cost" of the system, which also  covers fluid milk production,
for the whole country.  In order to share the cost among all producers,  provinces have agreed
to pool  all  milk  revenues,  including  fluid  milk revenues,  at the  national  level  and  then
redistribute revenues according to the provincial  share of all milk production. 5 Therefore,
after a breaking in period,  all producers will receive the same price for milk and adjustments
will be made for processors to pay similar prices  also.
As will be  discussed further  in a later section, the pooling of revenues  from all milk
at the  national level created the  opportunity to  implement  a national quota market.  As of
August 1, 1996, three provinces have agreed to participate  in a national quota market where
up to one percent of the provincial  share of total milk production quota could be exchanged.
The Offer to Purchase  Program  (OTPP). Until August  1, 1995, two Plans were used in the
OTPP.  Under Plan  A,  the  CDC purchased,  at the  support price,  all butter  or skim milk
powder that a processor would produce but could not sell  on the market at a higher price.
3The  final  part of this  statement  is  needs  qualification.  Provinces  were  responsible  for
collecting  levies from individual  producers  and some provinces  would collect levies  higher than
those  assessed  by the  CDC to  dispose  of the  products on  the  world market.  This  was done  to
discourage  over quota production.
4Quebec and  Ontario produce  close to 80 % of all industrial milk in Canada.
Presently,  only  six provinces  have  agreed  to  pool  revenues  from  all  milk.  A  parallel
agreement has however been signed by all provinces, excluding  Newfoundland  since this province
is not part of the National Plan, and this  agreement  is on pooling only a fraction of total revenue
from all  milk.  It is expected  that the three provinces which have not signed yet the agreement will
eventually  do so after further negotiations.
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Plan A acted  as a surplus removal  mechanism.  Plan B was used by  processors to regulate
their sales during the year.  Under Plan  B, processors  sold butter (or a few other specific
products) to the CDC but had to repurchase the product within one year at the same price.
This program was self-regulating and processors used it to avoid carrying charges associated
with holding the stock.  Consumers paid the carrying costs.
The CDC was purchasing butter or skim milk powder when a processor could not find
a market for milk that had been processed.  However,  it was possible that another processor
in the  same province,  or in  another province,  could have marketed  this milk at a higher
price.
6 Since  August  1, 1995, purchases  by the CDC  under Plan A will be made  only to
ensure adequate supply to the domestic market during seasonally deficient periods.  When
an adequate  level of stock is reached,  purchases under this Plan will be closed,  as it is the
case  at  the  present  time.  The  effective  surplus  removal  program  will  henceforth  be
administered through two new Plans : Plan C and Plan D.  When Plan A is closed, processors
have to sell butter to the CDC under Plan C.  For the CDC to purchase butter under Plan  C,
a processor has to declare  its "surplus milk" before transforming it into butter, and the milk
is  offered  to  other  processors  in  the  same  province,  as  well  as  to  processors  in  the
neighboring provinces.  If the milk is not required by the other processors,  then the CDC
buys it at the world price and assures its disposal.  Plan C has been put in place to insure that
as much milk as possible could be sold  in the domestic  market at a higher value (Paquette,
1995).  As of today, this Plan is not fully operational.
Purchases under D are  used exclusively  for conducting  the small export program.
Levels of export are determined by the Canadian Milk Supply Management Committee  and
milk is paid at the world price.
Optional  Export Program In the summer of 1995, provinces agreed to establish an optional
export  program (OEP).  The  administration  of the  program  is the responsibility  of each
province.  A processor who finds a market for a product has to approach its provincial Board
to secure milk supply, and he has to be supported  by the Board in its request  to the CDC.
The  provincial  Board  evaluates  if it  could  supply  the  requested  amount  of milk  at  a
negotiated  price with  the processor.  The  OEP  is  not  yet operational:  only  Alberta  has
submitted a proposal for export to the OEP Supervisory Committee.
The three major modifications to the national dairy policy have been implemented  in
order to comply with the WTO Agreement  and they are likely to affect the evolution and the
structure  of  the Canadian dairy sector in the next few years.  This will be the case even if the
NAFTA Panel decision  favors Canada's  position.  The anticipated  impacts as well as the
probable modifications to the Canadian policy and programs  in that case within the next five
6Such a situation within a province was not possible in all provinces. In Quebec for example,
the marketing  agreement between processors and the Federation des producteurs  de lait du Quebec
was such  that processors  could be supplied with  as much milk as they required  if they were  not
manufacturing  butter or skim milk powder.  Milk was sent to butter plants only as a last resort.  Of
course, butter plants  were not always  pleased with this agreeement,  especially in situations of cuts
in the provincial  MSQ.  A similar policy was also in effect in Ontario.
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years  are treated  in the following section  under Scenario  one.  Scenario  two discusses  the
situation where the Panel decision is less favorable  to the Canadian position.
IMPACTS  OF CURRENT  AND  ANTICIPATED CHANGES  IN  THE CANADIAN
DOMESTIC POLICYON THE STRUCTURE AND  EFFICIENCY OF THE DAIRY
SECTOR
Before  discussing different  scenarios,  one  has to realize that a common factor  will
affect all scenarios:  a decrease  in direct government  support.  Since the  mid-seventies,  the
federal  government contributed $6.03/hl to the target price.  This support level was reduced
by  10  percent  in  August  1993.  In  1995,  the  federal  government  announced  a  further
reduction of 30 over two years.
Scenario One: Panel Decision  Favours the Canadian Position
A  panel  ruling in  Canada's  favour  does  not  mean that  pressures  on  adjusting  the
supply management system will end.  All stakeholders  in the industry are well aware that the
next round of multilateral negotiation, which will start sometime  in 1998, will certainly focus
on  a phase  out  scheme of the high tariff rates  imposed  by several  countries  on different
commodities.  However,  due to the rigidity of the system, the impacts  on the structure of the
industry and on gains  in efficiency  at both the production and the processing  levels  are not
expected to be large.  Nonetheless,  the recent modifications  in the national  dairy programs
will allow economic  forces to begin indicating where milk production and processing would
concentrate  in Canada in a freer trade environment.  Moreover,  the recent  adjustments in the
dairy programs  will likely  generate  more pressure  from producers themselves  in order to
further  liberalize the industry in Canada within the next five years.  The reasons underlying
the above statements  are presented  in the following sub-sections.
Evolution  of  the Structure and Efficiency  of  the Production Sector.  The background paper
by Agriculture  and Agri-Food  Canada summarized  the  structure  of the  dairy sector.  The
major characteristics of the production sector  are threefold.  First, total milk production  has
remained at about the same level over the last thirty years, but the number of dairy farms has
decreased significantly (Figure  1).  Actually, the decrease in the number of farms during this
period  has been similar to that observed  in the  United  States (ISTC  1991).  Over the last
twenty  years,  the  average  herd size  in the  two  major  producing  provinces,  Quebec  and
Ontario,  has shown minimal increase, while the average herd size has grown slightly in the
other provinces (Figure  2).
The second structural change that occurred over the last two decades is the significant
increase  in average  yield per  cow,  which has  kept pace with that  observed in the  United
States as shown  in Figure  3.  However,  average yield per cow  in Canada  has always been
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lower than that in the United  States.  Some could argue that this may be due in part to supply
management,  especially  when one notes that the gap between  yields in Canada and  in the
United States has increased  since  1989 when significant  cuts in the national  MSQ occurred.
When  farmers  increase  their productivity per  cow,  they  have to purchase  the equivalent
amount of quota in order to market the milk, or they have to accept  a much lower price for
over-quota production.  Farmers realize they will overproduce their allocation towards  the
end of the dairy  year  and, of course,  quota prices  increase  at that time due  to increased
demand.  Since over-quota production levies are high,  it may be a rational economic decision
to cut variable costs for the remainder of  the dairy year and reduce production to comply with
the current quota level.  The incentive  for increased efficiency is therefore reduced.
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Figure 2.  Average Herd Size per Province  (Cows/Farm)
Figure 3.  Average  Yield  per Cow,  Canadian Provinces  Vs  United States
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Another  structural  characteristic  of the  sector  is  the  stability  over  time  of the
provincial allocations  of the national MSQ.  Provincial allocations of the national  MSQ are
mainly based on historical market shares.  Pressures have been growing over the last several
years to implement a national quota exchange market.  However, since quota regulations  and
the milk pricing structures  are specific to each province, and because they vary significantly
across  provinces,  an agreement  on  implementing a  national  quota exchange  market was
never reached.  Harmonization of provincial disparities were first required to insure  a level
playing field for all producers across provinces.
Moreover,  the relative  share of fluid milk quota to industrial milk quota varies across
provinces.  Therefore, producers located in a province with a relatively high ratio of fluid to
industrial milk quota would have had a relative advantage to bid in a national quota exchange
market.  Indeed, their average revenues would have been higher: fluid milk price is higher
than industrial milk price and producers  usually own both types of production quota.
The agreement on pooling revenues  from all milk that was reached by provinces in
order  to keep  supply  management  operational  within  the  country,  and  equitable  across
producers while complying with the rules under URA, created the opportunity to implement
a national quota exchange  market.  Even though the harmonization process is not complete
yet, this market should be operational  soon.  Once the harmonization process is complete,
revenues on a per hectoliter basis will be similar across provinces,  and the competitive  and
comparative  advantages  of each region for milk production  will be reflected  in the price
producers are willing to pay for quota.  The initial provision of the agreement on a common
quota market is that a province can withdraw from the exchange  market when  its net loss to
other provinces reaches  1 percent of its provincial share of milk production,  including both
fluid and industrial milk.
The  expected  implications  on  the  structure  of the  dairy  sector  of the previously
mentioned modifications to the national policy over the next five years are small.  However,
the direction is clear:  less efficient producers will have greater encouragement to sell quota,
leading to  more  consolidation  of farms  at  lower production  costs.  Due  to pressures  to
comply with the URA,  all provinces  will likely reach an agreement to pool milk revenues
from all milk
7 and a truly national  quota exchange market will become operational.  The
interprovincial movement of quota is difficult to predict and this is why the agreement among
the provinces includes the possibility  for a province to withdraw from the common exchange
market when it has lost 1 percent of its provincial share.
Very  few studies  have  investigated the  potential  impact  on  production  allocation
within the country of removing interprovincial  barriers.  Ewasechko  and Horbulyk (1995)
analyzed  the  interprovincial  reallocation  of  MSQ  for  industrial  milk  using  a  linear
programming  model  where  the objective  function minimizes  the  cost  of producing  and
transporting  milk  in  Canada.  Their  results  suggest  that  there  would  be  significant
7See footnote  5.
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modification to the present allocation,  and all provinces west of Quebec would increase their
production  level;  Quebec  and the  Atlantic  provinces  would  be net losers.  However,  the
authors  mention several  limitations  to  their  analysis,  including  the  lack of standardized
production  cost  data  as  well  as  the  fact  that  they  have  not  accounted  for  the  costs  of
processing and manufacturing  dairy products.  Another limitation to their study is that they
have not accounted for the relative levels of economic  efficiencies  across provinces and they
have not included quota prices in their analysis.  This  seriously limits the benefits of their
results  in policy analysis.
Another study by Lambert  et al suggests that the implementation of a quota market
between  Ontario  and  Quebec would  shift  milk production  from Ontario  to Quebec.  This
result is  contrary to that of Ewasechko and Horbulyk.  However,  Lambert et al's approach
accounts,  indirectly,  for  the  relative  levels  of economic  efficiencies  between  the  two
provinces by reflecting the willingness  to pay for quota.  Their model  is based on estimated
demand for and supply  of quota equations for both used and unused quota markets,  and the
equations  include several  variables to account  for different administrative  policies between
the provinces.  Results  show that as  much  as 5 percent  of Ontario's industrial  milk quota
would be purchased by Quebec producers within one year.  Results also suggest that the price
of other agricultural commodities would significantly affect interprovincial  quota transfers.
However,  the time frame of their analysis did not reflect similar milk pricing structures  nor
similar quota regulations  across provinces,  and this would likely affect quota movements.
Lambert  et al did  not  analyze  the  implementation  of a national  quota  exchange
market,  but the data presented in Tables  1 to 3 suggest that a likely result of such a modeling
exercise  would be the concentration  of industrial  milk production  in Quebec,  Ontario and
British Columbia.  Indeed,  quota prices  in the other provinces  are lower and the quantities
transacted are relatively  small.  Using a similar econometric modeling approach,  one would
have to  invoke the Lucas  critique (1976),8  and  expect significant  changes in the would be
estimated  parameters,  in  order  to  argue  that  milk  would  continue  to  be produced  in  all
provinces.  For  this  reason,  it  is  likely  that  there  will  be  pressures  from  producers  in
provinces with comparative advantages in dairy production to increase the  1 percent limit on
interprovincial  transfers, and this would contribute to increase the economic efficiency of the
supply management system.
8Lucas argued that people adapt their expectations, and therefore  their behaviour,  to the new
environment  when a significant policy change  occurs, and estimated parameters using  conventional
econometric  techniques are no longer reliable.
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Table 1.  Prices  and Quantities Traded of Unused  Quota  of Industrial Milk per
Region*
Year  PEI  NS  NB  Quebec  Ontario  I Man.  Sask.  Alberta  BC
P  Q  :  P  Q:P  QP  P  Q  P  P  Q  P  Q  P
85-86  10.18  50.18:  114.85  :25.11  1188125.26  10341  7.94  194
86-87  110.94  27.191  118.38  :25.79  1576,20.47  9971  13.04  68
87-88  :10.82  50.30  ,14.51  ,26.21  1316  21.39  10131  19.37  147
88-89  :  7.88  42.70  115.88  25.75  1548  21.94  12351  14.95  195
89-90  : 8.19  38.57'  :18.87  :24.55  1877:15.45  14571  16.401  12.41  223
90-91  12.16  22.99  124.99  29.46  1598  21.36  1055:  17.28  19.31  1571  18.07
91-92  13.75  30.301  :31.16  :36.29  1046128.71  8341  18.71  1  20.94  111!  20.82
92-93  :20.50  11.87:35.18  52:33.54  :37.17  1251,35.07  9091  20.76  :  29.30  87:  24.25
93-94  23.25  113.34137.61  32127.03  0.83:36.49  803131.81  15811  21.12  23.86  117,  29.33
94-95  24.24  89.11137.88  128127.48  1.02140.04  950137.44  12991  23.57  117.16  39.6  28.92  80!  3350
*  Data on quantities  traded were not always readily  available.
P  =  weighted price in $/kg of b.f.  Q = quantities  traded in thousand  kg of b.f./year
NS:  single quota in kg of b.f./day starting Oct. 94. (Used and Unused markets).  Expressed here in kg of
b.f./year.
Manitoba:  single quota  including fluid and industrial milk in kg of b.f./day. (Unused  market only).
Data on quantities traded were  not readily available.
Saskatchewan:  single quota  including fluid and industrial milk in litres/day.  Expressed here in kg of b.f/year.
(Unused market only)
Alberta:  1994-95  is incomplete.  Until March  only.
NB:  Quota in $/litres/day until Nov.  1990. Expressed here in $/kg of b.f.
Since Aug.  1993, single  quota including  fluid and industrial  milk in kg of b.f./day.  Expressed here
in $/kg of b.f./year.  Data on  quantities traded were not readily  available prior to  1992.
BC:  Prior to 1990,  only fluid quotas were transacted  and they included industrial milk allocation.
PEI:  There  is no fluid milk quota exchange and  farmers receive their fluid milk quota  according to their
industrial quota basis.
173Proceedings
Table 2.  Prices  and Quantities Traded of Used Quota of Industrial Milk per Region
Year  PEI'  NS  I  NB  I  Quebec  I  Ontario  Alberta  I  BC
_  P  Q  P  Q  P  P  Q  P  Q  P  Q  P
85-86  7.85  28.051  9.31  18.43  743.87  118.11  458.93:  5.99  27951
86-87  10.81  37.261  112.841  19.79  523.17  15.47  327.441  9.20  9.06  1
87-88  10.58  44.201  12.70  20.48  560.29  16.32  367.541  13.45  31.61
88-89  7.87  35.801  112.491  19.23  780.87  113.96  580.65:  9.05  60.81
89-90  8.03  18.89  12.29:  18.45  699.60  :11.81  560.60:  9.13  48.32:
90-91  13.13  33.88  17.28  23.20  724.42  115.31  530.89  10.76  37.50  10.90
91-92  13.75  50.58  19.41  26.04  1255.22  20.15  791.141  9.36  17.70  12.75
92-93  19.70  10.04  27.55  28.72  25.14  31.00  653.12  126.18  665.55:  19.23  27.33  15.31
93-94  18.06  72.82  31.66  31.20  30.25  388.49  26.36  619.09:  19.80  61.29  23.00
94-95  121.46  44.83  33.81  379.58  28.79  985.74
j 20.11  39.64  24.00
See Notes of Table 1.
Table 3.  Prices and Quantities Traded of Fluid Milk per Region
NB  Quebec  Ontario  Alberta  BC
_P  P  Q  P  Q  P  Q  P
I  . I  I
85-86  210.588  363.06  61219  281,92  894781  573,62
86-87  :  267.881  376.32  414391  275,68  763531  631,79
87-88  267.181  373.17  45511:  263,42  810531  598,82
88-89  243.17  347.65  57023:  266,59  110249:  563,69
89-90  257.42,  350.53  60636:  241,85  119855:  501,48
90-91  314.181  380.39  58122:  286,44  1049611  266,50  15451  409,66
91-92  303.171  35.27  519523:  347,52  1267091  281,72  82601  418,47
92-93  264.91  36.21  3141601  370,78  981791  322,40  69051  483,25
93-94  :  :  299,53  102701  553,36
94-95  _  [  __  __  297,24  9295[  598,14
P = weighted  price in  $/litres/day.  Q = quantities traded  in litres/day
See  Table  1 for other notes.
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The  most  important  policy  modification  with  respect  to  a  potential  increase  in
efficiency of the dairy sector is the implementation of the optional export program (OEP).
Producers have always resisted the implementation of voluntary export programs for several
reasons.  An obvious  reason  is that producing milk at a lower price for foreign customers
would not be seen favourably  by  Canadian consumers.  Another important  reason  is that
producers wanted to ensure compliance with the GATT Agreement  and not put themselves
in a position where they could be accused  of dumping dairy products on the world market.
The  impact of the OEP will depend upon the way it  is administered  by Provincial
Boards in each province.  Not all provinces have yet determined their administrative policies.
Producers in Ontario have decided that the decision to participate or not in this program has
to be taken collectively.  Therefore, if processors  find a market for a particular product and
if the Ontario Milk Marketing Board accepts that they will supply milk to this market, it is
a collective agreement and all producers are responsible to supply the agreed amount of  milk.
Operating the OEP  in this manner  has the advantage of sharing the risk and the marginal
revenues among all producers but this will not fully use the potential benefit of the program
for  increased efficiency  of the  sector.  Indeed,  increased  efficiency  could be  reached by
allowing producers who  can produce at lower costs to do so if market opportunities  can be
found, even if product prices may not be sufficient to satisfy high cost producers.  Moreover,
the potential for this policy to identify comparative and competitive advantages  of both the
production  and the processing sector will be deferred.
There  is a  significant  potential  increase  in Canadian  production  due  to  increased
economic  efficiency  (Weersink  et  al,  1990,  Romain  and  Lambert,  1995).  Therefore,
administrative policies which would allow different producers to supply milk for export at
different  prices  could  contribute  to decrease  pressure  on  quota  prices  as well  as  allow
producers  to  increase  their  size of operation  at  a  lower  cost,  and  hence  increase  their
competitive position.  This, however,  may diminish the overall power of  the provincial milk
marketing Boards due to a possible hole in the supply management system : producers will
have more latitude in their production decision.  Nevertheless, if the other provinces  follow
the lead of Ontario in their administrative policies of the OEP, the impact of this modification
to the Canadian dairy policy on the structure and efficiency of the sector will be positive and
small.
Another  factor that will affect the  performance  of the OEP  is the evolution of the
target price  for milk,  which is set by the CDC twice a year (August  1st and February  1st).
The Minister of Agriculture has announced a cut in dairy subsidy but producers  want this cut
to be picked up by consumers.  Producers'  argue that the target price is already well below
their  calculated  cost  of production  and  they  cannot accept  a  lower price for  milk.  The
previous  cut  in  1993  did not  result  in  lower  producers  prices nor  did  the cut  in  1995.
Increases in the domestic  demand,  perhaps due to increased advertising of dairy products,
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increased consumption  of industrial milk (dairy products)  steadily since  19929.  However,
the latest cuts in subsidy, which will account  for increased milk price to processors of about
a 3 to 4 percent in  1996, may have an effect on domestic demand for dairy products.  If there
is a decrease in domestic consumption,  producers  will face  cuts in MSQ  and this may put
pressures to develop the OEP.  Pressures will come from producers themselves because they
will not want  to invest  large amounts  of capital  in quota purchases  only to keep  the  same
level  of production,  as they  had to do  in the  1988  - 1992  period when national  MSQ was
reduced by  13  percent.
On the other hand, if the pressure to decrease the quantity demanded of dairy products
due to higher milk prices is  counter-balanced  by an outward shift in the demand function,  so
the national MSQ is not decreased,  the impact of  the OEP may be small, and the participation
in the OEP could remain marginal.  It is unlikely that the CDC will increase its support price
enough to compensate both the reduction in federal  subsidy and the increase  in the cost of
production.  However, producers  in Quebec  in particular, argue  that if they are not assured
of a target  price  that will  follow the  evolution  of their  cost of production,  they  will not
participate  in the OEP.  This position may change  depending upon the response in the other
provinces,  but the  impact on the structure  and performance  of the dairy  sector will remain
marginal.
Effects on the Structure and Efficiency of the Processing  Sector.  A possible rationalization
at the production  level has direct implications  at the processors  level. If milk production can
move from one province to another,  processors  in the selling province would become less
competitive  due to a shortage  of milk.  Processors therefore argued  for a level playing  field
and requested that raw milk could also move from one province to another.  The modification
of the surplus removal program  with the implementation of Plan C will allow interprovincial
movements of raw milk before  surplus milk is processed into butter and skim milk powder.
This should compensate  partly the potential  loss in competitiveness  of processors  located in
a production shrinking province, as well as maximize producers revenues  from the domestic
market.  This plan is presently suspended  because  it could have  created perverse effects  in
its original  form.  Discussions  are presently underway to insure an acceptable working  form
of  the  Plan and it should be operational  shortly.
With freer movement of milk across provinces  due to the  implementation of Plan C,
more aggressive  market development behaviour will develop.  Small butter plants will likely
have more difficulties to  operate continuously as they will have to make  milk available to
other processors  before manufacturing  butter for which they do not have markets.  Larger
and  more  diversified  processors  with  more  elaborate  marketing  strategies  will  have  an
advantage to expand operation  and enjoy economies  of size.
The evolution of the industry  over the last twenty years suggests that processors  in
Quebec have a competitive  advantage over processors  in Ontario, while processors  in the rest
MSQ.
9Note,  however, that 1992 was the end of a four year period of significant cuts in the national
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of Canada are in the worst position.  Figure 4  shows that the share of butter production  has
been  gradually  increasing  in  the rest  of Canada  while  it  has  decreased  in  Quebec  and
remained at the same level  in Ontario.  This reflects the fact that processors  in Quebec  have
gradually increased their share of higher value-added dairy products.  They have developed
an expertise  in manufacturing  and marketing  high value  added dairy products  which will
benefit them in a more competitive environment.
Better performance  by processors in Quebec over that of processors  in Ontario,  and
especially over that of  processors  in the rest of the country is also evident when one analyses
labour productivity  in manufacturing plants.  Figure 5 shows that the value added per person
employed is higher in Quebec than in other provinces.  Moreover, the annual increase  in the
value  added  by  employed  worker over the  1976-92 period  has  been $2,680  in  Quebec,
$1,390 in Ontario and only $580 in the rest of Canada (Romain and Lambert,  1994).  These
results suggest that the processing sector in Central Canada is better equipped  to face further
domestic competition.
The implementation  of  a national quota exchange market and the provision under Plan
C  for  milk  to  move  across  provinces  should  therefore  give an  indication  of where  the
comparative  advantage of the  dairy industry  lies within Canada.  However,  an important
factor which will contribute to the competitiveness  of  a province is the degree and the quality
of the interaction between producers and processors.  The recent policy changes favour the
concentration  of decision  making  in  the  hands  of producers  as  compared  to the  other
stakeholders  in the dairy sector,  and it transfers provincial autonomy  in decision-making  to
the national  level.  Processors,  in Quebec  in particular,  feel they  are being left out by  the
National  Policy reform while they believe they  could contribute  in a more  active way  to
increasing  the competitiveness  of the sector.  Some processors  argue that the system will
become more rigid because the major decisions will have to be agreed upon at the national
level  where  there  are  nine  possibly  divergent  positions.  The superstructure  created  to
administer  the National  Policy  may  constrain  the  decision  making  process  and  defer
decisions that used to be taken more rapidly at the provincial level.  This is one of the reasons
why no major changes  in the structure and efficiency of the dairy sector are expected over
the next five years.
Summary.  In summary, the impacts of  the recent modifications to the National Dairy Policy
are not expected to be major on the structure and efficiency  of the dairy sector over the next
five years if the NAFTA Panel rules in favour of the Canadian position.  The extent of the
impacts are closely linked to the final agreements that will be reached on the actual working
terms of Plan C, on the performance of the national  quota exchange  market, as well as on the
provincial  administrative policies of the OEP.  However,  the modifications  to the National
Dairy Policy, which follow from hard and difficult discussions across provinces, may be very
useful to face alternative  decisions of the NAFTA Panel  as it is discussed in the following
scenarios.
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Figure 4.  Index of Provincial Shares in Butter Production
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Scenario  Two:  A  Panel's Decision  in Favour of the United States' Position
This discussion considers  the alternative situation, where the United States position
that NAFTA dominates  is upheld.  We will do this through a series of changes,  which can
be interpreted  as decomposing a decision favouring the United States into steps or as possible
intermediate decisions made by the Panel, however  likely or unlikely such decisions may be.
We also focus on the plausible empirical magnitudes that are involved, which are interesting
in their own right but also provide some justification  for the assumptions used in the Meilke
et al paper.  The numbers that are used should be interpreted as indicative, not precise.
We consider three steps  in this "scenario two":  (a) tariff removal  on ice cream  and
yogurt only, (b)  tariffs off all  industrial milk  products,  and (c)  the removal  of fluid milk
tariffs.  Our  two  foci  are  on  (1)  determining  the  intermediate  effects  of these  policy
alternatives,  say  within  5 years,  and  (2)  looking  at  the  effects  of these  changes  on  the
domestic industry.  The broader range of consumption  and trade effects, and related issues
are left to other papers in this publication. To understand the magnitudes involved, Table 4
gives  the tariff levels  in effect beginning July 1, 1995  after the tariffication process of the
Uruguay Round Agreement of 1994, the final URA tariff (15 percent total decline), and the
annual decline in tariffs in percentage points under NAFTA where tariffs would become zero
percent in the time period negotiated (assumed to be 10 years for illustration).
Table 4:  Initial and Final Tariff Levels under the URA and Possible NAFTA Tariff
Declines
Product  URA  1995  URA Final  Tariff  NAFTA  Annual  Tariff
Tariff (%)  in 2001  (%)  Decline  over  10  yrs  to
_________  _0%
Butter  351.4  I 298.7  35 percentage  points
Cheese  289  245.7  29
Ice Cream  326  277.1  33
Milk  283.8  241.2  28
Yogurt  279.5  237.6  28
Source:  Uruguay Round Agreement documentation
Ice Cream and Yogurt.  First we will analyze the case of two industrial milk products,  ice
cream and yogurt.  Although accounting  for only  11 percent of the value of industrial milk
products,  they have been given relatively more trade policy attention among dairy products
because, they were the subject of an earlier (1988-89) GATT investigation  into the legality
of import quotas imposed  on those products by Canada in 1988  after the Canada-U.S.  Free
Trade Agreement  was signed.  That  investigation,  brought forward  by the United  States,
concluded that these import quotas were not legal under the GATT.  Singling out these two
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items  in the current panel decision is unlikely,  given that the previous problem was caused
by the imposition of import quotas that now have been removed.  However,  it still may be
useful  to consider  their  importance  in comparison  to  a larger  decision that applies  to  all
industrial milk products.
A decision in favour of the United  States, focused on ice cream and yogurt, would
be to lower the current  Canadian tariffs on U.S.  imports of 326 percent and 279.5 percent,
respectively, to zero over a time period to be negotiated.  This would mean  that, after that
time period,  ice cream and yogurt prices  in Canada will mirror those  in the  United States,
differing  only by transport and brokering  costs.  Immediately  following that period,  Canada
would  plausibly  be  on  an  import  basis  in those  products  if no action  is  taken,  so  that
wholesale  prices  in  Canada  would be  c.i.f.  prices,  equal  to U.S.  wholesale  prices  plus
transport and related  importing costs  (and a zero tariff).
This situation could be met by a variety of policy responses within Canada.  Basically,
Canada would have two options-to  reduce its industrial milk quota level, or to lower the
average  farm price for industrial milk in Canada (or some combination of the two).
In  the first option,  Canada would abandon  the ice  cream  and yogurt markets to the
lower-priced U.S. imports.  This would mean a reduction  in the national industrial milk quota
(MSQ)  equivalent  to the milk  supplies previously  required  to produce  the  ice cream  and
yogurt.  These two products account for 11  percent of industrial milk sales.  In volume terms,
the decline would be  a lesser proportion,  because  unit values  of ice  cream and yogurt are
higher than other industrial milk products. 1 0 With a decline  in MSQ levels, there would be
no need to reduce farm gate industrial milk prices  in Canada from their current levels.  This
option is, however,  unlikely.
In the  second case,  these two products  could be priced lower  at the point of trade
(wholesale level) to meet the U.S. import competition.  However,  Canadian processors  could
not continue paying  higher prices  for their raw milk  than their U.S.  counterparts,  and be
competitive with the lower prices of the imported product.  Therefore, this case would further
require  lowering  Canadian  farm  gate  prices  on  raw  milk  to  U.S.  levels,  assuming  that
Canadian  ice  cream  and  yogurt  makers  are  as  efficient  as  their  U.S.  counterparts."
However,  with  border protection  being  lowered  only  for  ice  cream  and  yogurt  in  this
scenario, farm milk prices would need to be lowered only enough to cover the  equivalent of
'°Recent  estimates  for  Ontario and  Quebec  are  that yogurt  and ice cream account  for 10
percent and 5 percent of their respective allocations of industrial milk (ISTC,  1991).  The shares in
the other provinces  are likely within this range.
"This assumption is supported by detailed engineering cost studies for plants built in Canada
and the United States for long run marginal  costs (ISTC,  1991) and is discussed  below.  If Canadian
plants are  higher cost operations  than their U.S. counterparts  during  the  intermediate run  before
adjustments to tariff declines are completed, farm milk prices in Canada would have to be lower than
those in  the United  States in order for the  Canadian industry  to be competitive, and conversely  if
Canadian plants are  lower cost.
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the milk supply going into  ice cream  and yogurt, roughly one-tenth of the industrial milk
supply.  The recent modifications to the national dairy policy could accommodate this option.
Milk used in the production of ice cream and yogurt would be sold as  "special milk class 5".
In fact, this is presently done for some products that use dairy constituents and that are traded
between Canada and the United States.
We can give some rough magnitudes to the numbers  that are  involved under these
options.  In the first case, the Canadian industrial milk quota will fall by the amount of milk
previously needed to produce the  ice cream and yogurt, say  10 percent of industrial  milk
sales.  With industrial milk production of 42.5 million hi (1994)  priced at current average
levels of $47.41/hl, this would represent  a loss in terms of gross revenues to the industry of
some $200 million.  In fact, the loss is likely to be somewhat higher because  milk used for
ice  cream and yogurt is priced higher than that used in other dairy products.  Although the
loss in net returns to producers would be considerably  less than the  loss in gross returns (say
no more than  1/3), this option is unrealistic  in that it assumes no response by the Canadian
industry.
The second option, reducing milk prices, is more attractive.  At the present time (using
1994 data) U.S. farm gate milk prices are equivalent to CDN$4 1/hectolitre landed in Canada,
assuming a one dollar per hectolitre (hi) cost of transportation.  This can be compared to a
1994 net farm gate milk price of $48.65 in Canada (market returns plus subsidy).  Therefore,
the effect of lowering  milk prices to the U.S.  level would be a fall in Canadian  prices  of
$7.65/hl (16  percent decline).  When that is multiplied by the share of total industrial milk
production  that goes into ice  cream and yogurt (10  percent),  the loss  in total gross returns
(net of levies) on industrial milk would be (0.16)(0.10) or 1.6 percent.  In dollar terms, this
loss would then be equivalent to about $30 million.'
2
What can we  conclude  about the  loss of tariff protection  on ice  cream and yogurt?
First, if this situation were to arise,  a price response  to the loss of tariffs on ice cream and
yogurt is considerably more attractive than simply walking away from that market and letting
it be served by imports, assuming a very elastic (excess) supply of U.S. product.  Second, the
possible loss to Canada from lowering farm milk prices to U.S. levels for only the ice cream
12The above  discussion  on this  second  case  is  still pessimistic because  it also assumes a
minimal reaction  (only a matching price) from Canadian processors.  In such  a case, losses to the
farm sector would be less than 2 percent.  However, recent discussions with processors  show that
several large  processors would welcome  such an opportunity to have  access to the U.S. market.
They strongly believe that the quality of their products compares favourably to that of U.S. products.
Also,  their experiences  in visiting plants in the United States convinced  them that they would be
competitive with their U.S. counterparts  if they could have access to the raw product at comparable
prices.  Considering the excess capacity of the production sector mentioned previously,  the net effect
on producers'  gross revenues  is unclear.  The impact of this Panel outcome on the structure of the
sector would, however, be negligible due to the small percentage of total production that is at stake.
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and yogurt classes  is relatively small  (less than two percent)'3. The small size of this effect
is mainly the result of the small share of the industrial milk market accounted  for by these
two products.  It also reflects  the relative  similarity of farm milk prices in the two countries.
Looking  only  at  possible  losses  to  ice  cream  and  yogurt  imports,  however,  may  be
excessively  pessimistic.  As  noted  in  footnote  12,  Canadian  processors  may  be  quite
competitive  in their costs and product quality and may be able to export to the United States
once U.S. border protection is reduced.
Industrial  Milk.  In 1994, the industrial milk sector accounted  for 42.5 million hectolitres,
roughly 60 percent of the quantity of all milk produced in Canada.  The net average price (net
of  levies  and  charges)  received  by  farmers  for  industrial  milk  (94/95  dairy  year)  was
$48.57/hl,  the  sum of the net market return  ($43.14/hl)  and the  direct  subsidy  ($5.43/hl).
Therefore,  this sector accounted  for market revenues to  farmers net of levies of about $1.83
billion, and was supplemented  by the total direct subsidy payment of $223 million.  In terms
of market revenues  at the farm gate,  the industrial milk sector accounted  for  53 percent of
total  farm dairy revenues  in 1992  (the remainder being accounted  for by fluid milk sales).
A Panel  decision  favouring  the  United States would  lower the  milk product tariffs
listed in Table 4 to zero over a negotiated time period.  This would have  a significant effect
on the Canadian  industrial milk market by changing the process  of price determination  in
Canada as well as lowering the price level.  However,  these lower price  effects are not likely
to be imminent.  Current tariffs  are so high that they prohibit imports like the previous  import
quotas,  and  Canada  remains  insulated  from price effects  in other  markets.  Further,  this
situation will not change over the course of the URA because even after the  15  percent URA
tariff reductions,  tariff levels  will  still be  prohibitive.  However,  even with the NAFTA-
imposed tariff declines of this scenario 2, the current tariffs  are sufficiently high that without
major  exchange  rate  changes,  imports  would  likely  become  seriously  competitive  with
domestic  industrial milk production  only in the last year of the phase-in period of tariff cuts.
This means that Canada would have an adjustment period where tariffs  will be falling, yet
the industrial  milk sector could function much  like  it does  today, with few  direct signs of
import competition  until the last year of the adjustment period.  At that point there would be
a major drop in price to U.S. landed import price levels, assuming  a perfectly  elastic U.S.
export supply curve.
However,  this situation  alone is unlikely  to prevail  politically if the  United  States
"wins" the Panel decision.  Rather than wait five, ten, or more years  for any benefit from a
Panel decision, the U.S. is likely to insist upon interim compensation.  The most likely form
of compensation would be an  increase in the tariff rate quota (TRQ)  allocated  to the United
States.  This could take the form of some  immediate "down-payment"  TRQ increase,  some
incremental  increase over the tariff phase-out period, or some combination  of the two.  This
would give the United States  an immediate benefit  in terms of sales to Canada, possibly an
1There  is a regional effect here too, given that ice cream and yogurt are produced mostly in
four to five provinces, but the effect on average  or blended farm level milk prices is  still relatively
small.
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unsustainable increase after full trade liberalization,  as is suggested  below.  Its effect within
Canada would be to reduce aggregate MSQ by the amount of the TRQ increase to the United
States in each year.
To examine the possible changes to Canadian producers in more detail, we start with
the U.S. farm gate milk price, particularly  its value landed  in Canada.  Using the 1994 U.S.
manufacturing  milk price,  the then-prevailing  exchange  rate  (much the  same  as today's
exchange rate), and an assumed cost of transportation (US$1.00/cwt), the landed cost of U.S.
milk in Canada would be $41/hl (Meilke et al,  1996).  This should be compared to the  1994
cost  of raw milk to Canadian  processors of $47, the difference  being $6/hl  or almost  12
percent.  The point to note is that with current milk prices  and exchange  rates, and  using
aggregate  date, the U.S.  landed import value is within  12 percent of the current processor
cost of raw milk in Canada.
If we were to fine tune these numbers,  the changes would tend to widen the Canada-
U.S.  price  difference  by  several  dollars.  First,  the  cost  of raw  milk to  Canadian  milk
processors  is based upon target return, obtained by selling the milk as butter and skim milk
powder.  In fact, a majority of Canadian industrial milk is sold into higher valued uses such
as cheese, ice cream, and yogurt.  The average price paid would then be somewhat above the
$47  level.  Similarly,  it is possible that U.S.  milk exported  to Canada could be procured at
prices lower than the average  U.S.  manufacturing milk price.  Together, these two factors
could increase the Canada-U.S. price difference to as much as $8 - $9 per hectolitre, or about
17-19 percent.  This could be particularly important in some regions.
Leaving aside for the moment the possible increases in TRQ to the United States, this
illustrates why the Canadian industrial milk sector would still be well-protected  right to the
last  year of a phase-in  of tariff cuts  under  a Panel  decision  favouring  the dominance  of
NAFTA rules.  The lowest  tariff level in the last year of a ten year (linear) phase-in is 28
percent, and that would still leave the average U.S. product uncompetitive  against Canadian
products made with current Canadian raw milk prices.
14 This would still be true for a 15 year
phase-in (where the last year's tariff then would be at least  19 percent) and possibly for a 20
year phase-in (the last year's tariff would be at least  14 percent).
s 1
4U.S. products could be competitive  in that last year if Canadian processors were much less
efficient  that their U.S. counterparts,  but, from evidence discussed later, this appears not to be the
case.
'5It should also be noted that when the protective  tariff is imposed on an intermediate  or
finished product like  any of the manufactured  milk products,  the effective protection on the  raw
material is greater than what appears to be the case from the nominal or apparent tariff.  If the raw
milk accounts for half the costs of making the more processed product, its effective protection could
be as high as twice the apparent tariff as would be the case if  the other costs of processing (other raw
material costs, labour costs,  capital and machinery costs, etc.) are comparable  to those of the U.S.
competitor.
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What this reveals is that under current  conditions, especially the exchange rate, 1 6 the
difference  in raw milk  costs between  Canadian  and U.S.  farm  sources facing  a Canadian
processor  may  not be exceedingly  large-farm  gate milk  prices  calculated  on an  import
(c.i.f.)  basis  in  Canada  are  between  10  and  19  percent  under  current  policies  and
circumstances.  Where within this range the difference  lies depends upon assumed transport
costs, whether procurement  costs  in the United States  are at or below the average price of
manufacturing  milk, and whether  Canadian milk supplies are prices  at or above the target
price.  Secondly, the combination of similar raw milk costs, high current tariffs and phase-in
periods of 10 years will leave Canadian raw milk prices  largely unaffected  for almost all of
the phase-in period.  However difficult the adjustment to lower milk prices and MSQ levels,
Canadian dairy farmers will have most of the full phase-out period before any serious price
changes from the NAFTA  Panel decision will be seen.
Farm  Prices. The next question concerns the implications of these changes at the farm level.
First, what will happen to farm gate returns and second, what will this mean for milk supplies
within Canada'?  On the first, the  1994/95  net farm return for industrial milk (using Ontario
data), from market returns and the direct subsidy, net of levies and fees, was $48.57/hl, made
up of the market return component of $43.14/hl  and the direct subsidy, $5.43/hl  As  these
numbers  are based on target returns, actual farm market returns may be slightly higher.
Zero  tariffs  on  manufactured  milk  products  will  place  strong  pressures  on  milk
processors to cut costs to be competitive with imports that are made with cheaper milk raw
materials.  This  can  be  avoided  only  if, in  other  areas  of the  milk  processing  activity,
Canadian  milk  processors  have  a  strong  cost  advantage.  Our  reading  of the  available
evidence (mostly from studies in 1991, reported by Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, 1995,
and discussed in more detail later  in this paper) suggests overall similarity in non-raw milk
processing costs, although this would be  exchange rate sensitive.  The current exchange rate
may  give Canadian processors  some advantage, but we lack enough  information on current
comparative  costs  to  quantify  it.  Therefore,  we  will  make  the  possibly  conservative
assumption  that processor  costs  are  now similar  in the two  countries,  resulting  in strong
pressures  to lower  raw milk  prices  in Canada  to U.S.  levels  to  make  manufactured  milk
products competitive.
Using  1994 data (above),  market returns paid to farmers by processors  dropping  to
U.S.  levels would mean a decline from CDN$46.85/hl to levels in the vicinity of $41,  a drop
of almost $6/hl  at  the prevailing (and  current) exchange  rate.  However, part of this price
16The importance of the exchange rates in competitiveness  calculations is illustrated by the
rate changes within only the last five years.  In 1990 the average exchange rate  was 1.15  (Canadian
dollars per U.S. dollar) and in  1994 the value was 1.39,  a decline in value of the Canadian dollar of
21 percent.  Farms or processors that were uncompetitive  with imports in  1991  could be exporting
profitably by  1994.  For a longer term perspective on these price comparisons,  it may be preferable
to use an average value  of the Canadian dollar over a number of years, probably near US$0.80.  If
such a value were used for current price comparisons,  the landed price of U.S. milk in Canada would
fall from CDN$41.02  at the  1994 actual exchange rate, to  CDN$36.89.
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drop should be offset by a reduction in levies.  With an open market there will be no need to
finance  export losses or special domestic  programs.  Consequently, producer  returns will
increase  by the removal of the within-quota  levy ($2.18/hl) and possibly other charges (e.g.,
domestic butter program  costs, some marketing board fees).17 Considering only the in-quota
levy,  the  result will  be a  net price  drop to producers  from  the tariff removals  and  levy
removal  of $3.65.  Ignoring  the  direct  subsidy,  farmers'  net market returns  can  then  be
expected  to  decline  from  $43.14/hl  (1994/95)  to  $39.49/hl  after  the  tariff  removal  is
complete, a reduction of 8 percent.  In addition, there is the likely drop in production (MSQ)
levels that will be needed when U.S. TRQ levels are increased.
The final variable  affecting net producer returns is the direct subsidy.  It is primarily
a domestic policy variable and is not centrally  affected by the change in tariffs, but it could
be  increased to offset a tariff-induced  fall in market prices  in order to maintain  domestic
production.  In fact, it has been cut in recent years as  a budgetary  measure and is slated to
decline to zero over the next five years.  This could be a second source of decline  in producer
net returns  (after possible  tariff cuts)  unless  support prices  are  raised to compensate  for
reductions in the subsidy.'
8 By 1996/97 the subsidy will have fallen to $3.80/hl (from $5.43
in 1994/95) and will be phased out entirely by the year 2 001 as planned with ongoing budget
cutbacks.  To look only at the trade policy  issues, we treat the direct subsidy as continuing
at $3.80/hl  and add  it to  the  new (post-tariff removal)  market  returns of $39.49,  leaving
producer net returns from all sources at $43.29 after tariff removal  is complete.
Implications  for  farm milk supplies in Canada. With the industrial milk sector  facing the
prospect of a decline in milk prices under this scenario  due to the removal of milk product
tariffs, albeit some years into the future, what will be the likely supply response?  Will the
industry be competitive enough to maintain its domestic  market?  A quick response might
be that  domestic  production  would  decline  in the  face  of price  falls on  the  order of 10
percent, and lose some or most of its domestic market.  Such a response may be based on the
assumption that since prices  would be equalized  to costs, and given higher milk prices  in
Canada, costs of the Canadian firms in this market also would be higher.  Therefore,  with a
decline  in tariffs, domestic production  and market share would also decline.
7  As mentioned previously,  since  August 1995 the within-quota  levy is no  longer in effect,  but
the  new  pricing  policy  is  equivalent,  for  producers,  to  having  the  former  within-quota  levy
imposed.
,8  In fact, this did occur for the  1993  reduction in the direct subsidy  when it fell from $6.03/hl
to $5.43/hl  and it may have occurred in August  1995.  If so,  net farm returns per hectolitre will
be unaffected  as long as tariff protection  is  prohibitive.  Once  tariffs have fallen  to zero,  then
market returns  for milk products  will be determined by  U.S.  milk prices and  there will be no
opportunity to raise these prices  to compensate  for any direct subsidy reductions.  In any case,
passing  declines  in the subsidy onto consumers  through increased  support prices is  not costless.
It will lead  to reductions  in consumption and resulting declines  in MSQ.
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Such  an analysis can be erroneous  due to the presence of binding marketing quotas
on industrial production.  The critical question,  given these quotas, is the level of milk supply
prices within this quota-regulated market.  Once one acknowledges that with binding quotas
the supply price will be below the market price, then the  supply response to a lowering of
nominal prices, in conjunction with the removal of the quota restriction, could be positive or
negative.
Farm  Level Supply Price of  Industrial  Production. The question here  is, what is the supply
price of industrial  production  in Canada  at the  farm  level. To  be competitive  in the  final
industrial  milk products there is also the question of the competitiveness of  processors,  apart
from their milk  raw material  costs.  These  questions  are not  easily answered  for several
reasons.  First,  on  the farm  side, the  supply curve  cannot be  observed  using traditional
econometric  methods  when quotas  are imposed  because  changes  in prices  will induce no
changes in output.  Second, with  a small number of processors  in some markets possessing
market power, there is the usual difficulty in determining actual costs under such conditions.
Third,  for both  farmers  and  processors,  when  there  are  relatively  high  returns  and  little
competition,  costs  may  not  be  kept  as  low  as  they  would  be  under  more  competitive
conditions.  Alternatively,  with  added  competition  and  narrower  margins,  productivity
usually rises and costs  or margins are pushed down.  The  question is what is the scope for
cutting costs when faced with lower prices.
For  farm costs, we have  several observations.  First, we  know that with marginal
prices between $48/hl and  $49/hl and with relatively high values of traded industrial milk
quota, farmers are  competitive at prices below this level.  Exactly how much below is not
clear, but the very high MSQ prices  in some markets  suggests that marginal  costs may be
considerably  below  current  milk prices.  To make  more definitive  statements  about cost
levels on the basis of quota values requires detailed  analysis on that topic specifically.
Second, Barichello and  Stennes (1994)  analyzed traditional farm  cost data  for three
U.S. states and three Canadian provinces,  using the same methodology and similar data sets,
for 1989.  The results show that average costs  for the three Canadian provinces  were in the
range  of $37/hl  to  $45/hl in  1989  prices.  Translating these costs  into  1994 dollars  would
require  an adjustment for inflation and for increased productivity such as in milk yields per
cow.  Given low inflation levels  over this period, this adjustment would likely be no more
than a five percent increase.  Taking the mean of the cost range as $41/hl (1989 dollars), a
5 percent  increase would place average costs  at $43/hl (1994  dollars).
However,  a second observation from this study was that unit costs fell significantly
when herd size increased  from 40-50 cows into the range of 60-70 cows and above.19 In the
latter group, average costs averaged about $35/hl.  If adjusted upward by 5 percent to put this
in 1994 terms, average  costs would be in the range of $37-38/hl.  Since  1989 there has been
19This observation  is also made  by Desbiens  and Negrave  (1993)  for Ontario  and Quebec
dairy farms, where the highest deciles of dairy farms  have higher costs, particularly  the  10th decile.
Romain and Lambert (1995)  also report similar conclusions.
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considerable  exit  among dairy farms  and  this has  been most pronounced  among  smaller
farms.  Therefore,  a more recent review of farm cost data would likely reveal this changing
industry structure  by showing a larger average  herd size and lower average costs.
Third, similar results for raw milk costs of production between the two countries have
been  reported  by  other  authors  for  the same  period  (Jeffrey,  1992,  Phillips,  White  and
Stonehouse,  1989,  and Price Waterhouse,  1991), where U.S.  farm level costs are lower but
within about  10 percent using exchange rates that value the  Canadian dollar at high levels
compared to current rates.  It is also worth noting that U.S. studies of comparative  milk costs
between the two countries typically find U.S. farms at a large (25-30 percent) cost advantage
(e.g., Baker, Hallberg,  Tanjuakio, Elterich,  Beck and  Liebrand,  1990, and  Nicholson  and
Knoblauch,  1993), a result that we suggest is considerably  in error.
The conclusion that even taking average costs across all (1989)  farms, a "high cost"
scenario,  and using them to indicate long run marginal costs, those costs in  1994 would be
around  $43/hl.  When  compared  with a  landed cost of U.S.  milk of $41,  the  industry  in
Canada would be close to being competitive today.  With such costs and no structural change
occurring,  Canada would likely lose marginally in terms of market  share to U.S.  product.
However,  an extension of recent trends,  in terms of structural change to larger farms, would
be likely to lower these costs more in Canada relative to those in the United States.
An alternative scenario would recognize more explicitly the current trend in structural
change  to larger farms that is now occurring in Canada and that will push average herd sizes
above 50-60  cows.  Judging  by the data referred to above,  such farms have  1989  average
costs in the $35/hl range (slightly  less in the United States).  An adjustment to  1994 prices
would still leave their costs below $40/hl.  This would leave Canada very  competitive  at the
farm level,  given  current  landed  U.S.  prices  around $40/hl.  For those  farms below such
sizes, the phase-in period  gives them valuable  time to increase  their size (and make other
changes) to achieve the lower costs described.  The longer term implication  is that under this
scenario, with net farm prices for industrial milk in the vicinity of $40/hl, farms with fewer
than  about  60  cows  will  be  increasingly  uneconomic  for  farmers  with  any  reasonable
alternative value for their  labour.
Processing  margins. On the processing side, there are three studies  on comparative costs
between the two countries  for several milk products,  and two of  the three were done in 1991
(ISTC,  1991, Price Waterhouse,  1991, and McClain  (referenced  in 1992)).  The latter two
studies that examined existing plant costs showed that U.S. plants have lower margins  (i.e.,
manufacturing  costs only),  but the  United  States advantage  varies  by  product line.  For
example, the Price-Waterhouse  study finds only a 2 percent  advantage  in fluid milk while
it finds a 24 percent advantage for ice cream.  The third study was interesting in that it looked
at long run marginal costs  for plants newly built in both countries at a size that was judged
to be the minimum economic  scale.  These sizes were consistent with the production  base
and market size  in Ontario  and Quebec,  but may not have been feasible or economically
viable  in  some of the other  provinces.  It found  that costs  were  virtually  equal between
Canada  and the United  States  for cheese  and  yogurt, while there  was  a  slight U.S.  cost
advantage  for ice cream.  The study concluded that in all three products the processing cost
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differences were not significant  and that such Canadian plants  would be competitive with
their U.S.  counterparts if they could buy raw milk at comparable  prices.
These studies suggest that existing plants  may suffer from some cost disadvantages
when we consider their current scale and the high value  of the Canadian dollar that existed
at the time.  However,  Canadian processors  could build new,  larger processing plants and
operate  them competitively,  even  at relatively  high exchange  rates.  Using more current
exchange rates would ensure this competitiveness.  There are some  indications that mergers
are taking place among milk product processors across  Canada which could be interpreted
to support the study findings just noted.  That is,  such firms are positioning themselves  with
larger  scale operations  to be competitive with the United  States when the border becomes
more  open.  This  says  that  once  these  adjustments  in  the processing  sector take place,
processing margins will be roughly the same as (or lower than) those in the United States.
With  similarly priced raw milk,  as would be  likely to occur when tariffs are removed,  the
Canadian milk product industry  will be competitive with the United States.
Overall  prospectsfor the industrial  milk sector under U.S. free trade.  We conclude  the
following from the above review of the evidence.  First, the Canadian industrial milk industry
is, or  is in the process of, becoming competitive with the United  States at both the farm  and
processing  levels and at current exchange rates.  On the farm side,  price falls to about $40/hl
coupled with a removal of quota costs and constraints,  can be accommodated  by the industry.
However,  farms at the bottom of the size distribution, those with fewer than 50-60 cows,  will
be  pressured  by  the prospect  of these  lower prices  to  increase  herd sizes  to  exploit  size
economies,  or exit the industry.  This process has been occurring  for decades  but will  likely
intensify  in the next few years as lower trade barriers  with the United States are experienced.
The same general  observations apply to the processing sub-sector as well.  If there is a major
change in exchange rates, such as a Canadian dollar climbing to U.S.$0.85-0.90,  then greater
adjustments  will  be needed  to  maintain  competitiveness,  mostly  at  the  farm  level.  This
structural change will increase the competitiveness of the Canadian industry, perhaps enough
to be profitable  at higher exchange rates.  There is even the possibility of generating  exports
of some milk products to the United  States.
Finally,  there is no evidence  to support the prediction of a collapse of the Canadian
milk sector as was recently predicted  within Canada (Informetrica,  1995)  if tariffs  on U.S.
product imports  are removed.  There are likely to be challenging  adjustments to larger sized
operations at both farm and processing levels,  but as just noted, this has  been a continuous
process  for decades.  Similarly,  there  is not likely to be any  large  industrial milk market
available  for  the  taking  by  U.S.  dairy  exports.  The  milk  market  is  likely  to  be  quite
competitive  between the two countries,  as one would expect with largely the same inputs,
technology  and know-how being used, open borders for purchased inputs, and similar costs
of capital  and labour once the exchange rate is taken into account.
Fluid  Milk.  This final section  involves the fluid milk sector, specifically a reduction in fluid
milk tariffs  (with the United States) to zero over some negotiated adjustment period.  Tariff
changes here are almost as important as those  in the  industrial milk sector as the fluid milk
sector across Canada  is slightly more than 2/3 the size (in output weight) of the industrial
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sector.  In some provinces (the Maritimes (aggregated),  Ontario, and British Columbia),  the
fluid  sector  is  larger than the industrial  sector.  Fluid milk  production  in  1992  was  27.2
million hectolitres, or 39 percent of Canadian milk produced.  As in the United  States, fluid
milk regulations  and pricing  is determined  at  a provincial  (state)  level,  although  there  is
presently  little trade in fluid milk across provincial boundaries.  Milk destined for fluid uses
is priced  at a premium above  industrial milk  levels in both countries, but that premium is
larger in Canada than in most U.S. states.  The situation in 1994, drawn  from Meilke  et al
(1996), is that the landed price in Canada of U.S. fluid milk would be CDN$44.27/hl,  while
the net of levy  producer  return  for  fluid  milk  in Ontario  was  $56.20/hl.  The difference
between the two countries  is $11.93/hl  so Canadian prices would fall by 21 percent if they
were lowered to U.S.  levels.
The trade issues resulting from a negative  Panel decision are similar to those noted
above  for ice cream and yogurt.  First, the current tariff on fluid milk is 283.8 percent,  and
it would be  lowered to zero  over some  negotiated time period such  as  10  or more years.
Using  1994 data, the result would be a fall in fluid milk prices  of some $12/hl  from current
levels (e.g.,  $56/hl for Ontario) to the landed U.S. price of $44, or a decline of about $1.20/hl
per year if there is a ten year adjustment period.  In aggregate terms,  given current fluid milk
output of 27.2 M hi, this tariff reduction would mean a decline  in industry revenues  of $326
million, or 21 percent of total current fluid revenues. In fact, the decline would be somewhat
less than this if we considered  the increase in fluid milk consumption that would accompany
the 21  percent price fall.  The  significance of this change  in profitability  can be compared
with the situation  for ice  cream  and yogurt; the  fall  in fluid revenues  would be about ten
times the  decline  experienced  in the  ice  cream  and  yogurt  markets.  As  in  the  case of
industrial milk, there is also the likelihood of an expanded fluid milk import quota (TRQ) for
the United States.  This will not directly  change the unit returns for  fluid milk producers  but
it will lower individual farm fluid quota holdings, and hence also lower fluid milk sales.
With a price decline as large  as it is in this case, the question of the competitiveness
of this part of the milk industry is raised.  Already there have been claims in the Canadian
media of massive farm and job losses if the United States wins this NAFTA panel decision
(e.g.,  Informetrica,  1995).  The competitiveness  of the  fluid milk  subsector,  after  tariff
reductions are phased in, will depend upon whether the fluid milk processors can match the
landed cost of imported fluid milk with no tariff.  This depends,  as for industrial milk earlier,
upon the two component issues, whether farm fluid milk production  in Canada is profitable
at the U.S. farm gate milk price,  and whether the processing sector's  margins in Canada can
match those in the United States.
At the farm level in those  cases where fluid production is accounted for separately  at
farm  levels  (i.e.,  before  fluid and  industrial milk  are pooled,  or in those  regions (if any)
where  pooling does not  occur)  one question  is whether  Canadian  fluid operations  can be
profitable at a price of CDN$44/hl, assuming that Canada would be on an import basis vis-a-
vis the United States.  In this case the price with which Canadian  farms must compete  is the
U.S. fluid milk price in the nearby would-be exporting state, plus the cost of transporting and
importing that milk  into Canada.  This U.S.  price will vary by  state and the transport costs
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will  do  likewise,  so  for  a realistic  answer  to this  question,  a  detailed  analysis  would  be
needed  for  each milkshed  or province.  In fact,  it may be  possible  that milk  coming into
Canada from the United States could have  been purchased  at the U.S. industrial milk price
fo Grade A milk.  In this case,  the landed import price of milk from the United States would
be $41/hl,  compared  with the current Ontario fluid milk price of $56/hl.  The question is
whether Canadian  fluid milk operations would  be competitive  at the $41/hi price.
The  evidence  on this  matter was  evaluated  in more detail  in the previous  section,
where farm cost data were reviewed with reference  to a landed import price of $41  for U.S.
industrial milk.  The  finding was  that this would  represent  a fall  in producer  net  market
returns  of some  $5/hl  or  a net  market return 8% lower than current  levels.  Even with  no
structural  change  in the  milk  industry  since  1989 (e.g.,  no  change  in average  herd  size),
average farmers would be close to meeting their average  costs.  Since there has already been
considerable  structural change since that time, and the process will almost certainly continue,
it  is  likely that  most  farms  could  cover  their  costs  at the  landed import  price of $41/hl.
Therefore,  it remains clear that Canadian dairy farms would be covering their costs  for fluid
milk  based on  imported  U.S.  product  at $41/hl,  although  they  would  be receiving  lower
revenues than presently.  Even if this  were not so for the  smallest  farms, farms in the 60+
herd size range would be competitive.
On  the  processing  side,  the  evidence  is  also  similar  to  that  discussed  above  for
industrial milk,  only  fluid  costs  are  even  closer to U.S.  levels.  Price  Waterhouse  (1991)
found U.S.  costs only 2 percent lower than Canada's,  and McClain  found the U.S. advantage
to  be  13  percent.  Revising  such  data  to  embody  current  exchange  rates  would  almost
certainly  show Canada to be at a cost advantage.  Further,  we see merger and acquisition
activity in  fluid milk processing that  is leading to larger  firms with greater concentration,
making it even more  likely that Canadian plants  will operate at  higher capacity levels and
with lower margins.  The conclusion is that both farms  and processors  are most likely to be
competitive  with  U.S.  fluid milk imports  if tariffs  were removed,  particularly  if trends  in
consolidation and  firm size in Canada continue.
However, if pooling of milk revenues becomes  more widespread,  the farm sector will
be responding not to a separate  industrial price and fluid price but a pooled price or weighted
average of the two.20 This will not affect processors but will primarily alter prices at the farm
level. Pooling will preserve  the results already  noted above, except  that the pooled price will
exceed the industrial milk price.  For a Canada-wide pool  and landed import prices of $41/hi
for industrial milk and $44 (or $41)  for fluid milk, the weighted  average price will be about
$42.30/hl (or $41/hl).  If pools are set up for smaller regions, the weighted price will depend
upon  the  relative  size  of the  fluid  and  industrial  sectors,  with  prices  closer  to previous
industrial milk levels  in a province like Quebec with a larger proportion of industrial milk,
and higher prices  in a province  like B.C.  with a larger proportion  of fluid milk.  Therefore,
2 0Editors note:  It is interesting  that a detailed discussion  of impacts of freer trade retains the
notion of administered prices.  The U.S. and Canadian papers presented here all have  vestiges of this
economic anomaly.
190Barichello and Romain
pooling may make Canadian dairy farms more likely to be competitive than was discussed
in section b) above  for industrial  milk, even if the Canadian  industry's total revenues will
remain the  same as prior to pooling.
To  conclude,  fluid milk tariff removal  will  have  a  significant  effect  on  the  milk
industry  in Canada by lowering fluid milk revenues by about one-fifth.  However, at current
exchange rates and milk costs, the Canadian  industry still will be competitive, possibly more
so than  in the case of industrial milk because  landed import prices of fluid milk could be
$3/hl higher than comparable industrial milk prices.  From available evidence,  this is just as
true at the processor  level  as at the farm level. The situation  is slightly modified when we
take into account the pooling of industrial and fluid milk that is occurring across the country.
Farmers then will have to face a marginal price  on their total milk supply that is somewhat
higher than on their industrial milk if that market was kept separate at the farm level.  Instead
of having to meet an industrial price of about $41/hl under no tariffs, with fluid milk included
and pooled they would have to meet an overall milk price of $41-$42/hl with which more
farmers  would  find  themselves  competitive.  Again,  there  appears  to  be  no  basis  for  a
prediction of dramatic decline in dairy farm numbers and processing plants following a Panel
decision favouring the United States as reported in Informetrica (1995).
SUMMARY  OF THE TWO SCENARIOS
Regional Distribution ofproduction.  The economic forces to redistribute milk production
across  regions of Canada  are  already present  as outlined  in  Scenario  1, arising  from the
national pooling of milk  and  the  imminent  national  quota exchange.  They  will benefit
producers  wishing to sell in the higher cost regions by raising their quota values,  and will
benefit producers wishing to expand  in the lower cost regions by lowering quota values to
them.  Scenario  2 will add to these pressures to redistribute milk supplies, particularly  in the
adjustment period.  Increased trade with the United States would occur first with lower milk
prices,  prompting  farm  consolidation  and  average herd  expansion  within  Canada.  This
process  of growth  would  occur  during  the  adjustment  period  where  tariffs  would  be
declining,  and would occur via quota transfers  from high cost  farms to lower cost farms.
This would mean that higher cost regions also would see more of  their quota moving to other
regions, resulting in greater regional specialization  in production.  As noted in scenario  1, it
is difficult with available information  to predict exactly which provinces  would expand  and
which ones would contract.  Again, this process of increased regional specialization  would
occur in scenario 1 but would occurr more quickly under scenario 2.
Farm  Structure.  The size distribution of dairy farms has been changing over at least the last
30 years and under both scenarios  1 and 2 this process would continue and speed up.  In fact,
the data on average herd size shows that the process has already  started.  After years of slow
increases  in  herd  sizes,  virtually  all  provinces  now  show  that  average  herd  sizes  are
increasing quickly in the last two years.  This is exactly what one would expect as milk prices
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are expected to decline,  as farms can cut unit labour costs  at larger herd sizes.  If the U.S.
size structure  is any indication, this does not mean that Canadian dairy farms would be at the
1000+ herd sizes  found in California.  Rather, the likely result would be that economic farm
sizes will begin around  50-70 cows.  So there would be a substantial shrinking  in the left
hand  tail of the  current Canadian  size distribution  so that farms with  fewer than 50 cows
would become a rarity rather than the mean level as it is now in Ontario and Quebec.  A good
indication of future farm sizes probably  can be found in the adjacent U.S. states.  Ontario and
Quebec  farms would look like New York farms in average size ( about 70 cows), while B.C.
farms would be more like Washington State with somewhat higher average herd sizes.
Quota Markets and Values.  The existence of quotas and quota markets would be different
under scenarios  1 and 2.  Under the first scenario,  with URA provisions defining the extent
and  pace  of tariff reductions,  there  would still  be  active quota  markets  at  least to  2001.
Following that, the pace of tariff reductions would be  governed by the provisions of  the next
WTO round of trade negotiations.  Quotas would be binding until world market prices plus
applicable  tariffs get  close to Canada's domestic  milk prices,  and that may be some  years
after the end of URA tariff reductions  (2001).  Under scenario  2, the existence  of quotas
would be  to the last year of the negotiated adjustment period.
Within this period  of active  quota markets,  there would likely  be increased  quota
demands  and trade under either scenario.  The mere existence  of a national  quota exchange
would encourage more trading between regions to rationalize production  and move toward
greater equality in costs across regions and  farms.  There would also be more quota trading
from the pressures that are mounting for farms to cut their costs by increasing  herd sizes.
This would be so particularly under scenario 2, under which there would be lower milk prices
following the adjustment period.  During this period the demand for quota would be expected
to increase  more than the supply,  raising quota prices initially.  This would be sustained  into
the adjustment period  as quota demanders would  likely be  enjoying lower unit milk costs
from their expansion, presumably until the last few years of quota trading when quota values
become constrained  by their limited future life.  The late importance of  this factor arises from
the high discount rates that are associated with these quotas, typically in the range of 25 to
35 percent.  When one factors in the likely increase  in TRQs to the United States, it is even
more  likely  to  see quota  values  increase,  because  marginal  returns  will  increase  with a
reduction  in both MSQ and  fluid quota.
Another  interesting aspect  of quota trading under scenario  2,  is that there would be
increased quota values for a number of years in several provinces,  especially during the first
half or more of the adjustment period.  This would be relevant to those farms which exit the
industry during that period because  of the greater financial benefits  from the higher values
on the  quota.
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SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS
Dairy policy in  Canada  is a period  of significant  change,  caused  by  the Uruguay
Round Agreement (URA), possibly  the NAFTA, and by federal government budget cuts.
There are two main elements to this change, the modification of domestic policy to make it
congruent with the disciplines  of the URA, and the reduction in currently high tariff levels.
The first class  of changes  is  in the process  of design  and  adoption.  The second  class of
changes  will  ultimately  occur  as  part the  next  Round  of WTO  trade  negotiations,  with
agreement and implementation  sometime after the year 2000.  It is also possible that changes
will occur more quickly  if  a NAFTA Panel hearing, brought on by the United States, decides
in favour of the United States.  In this case, policy change will occur quickly at the end of
a tariff cut phase-in period.  That would have to be negotiated.
Any  price  declines  in  Canada  associated  with  freer  trade  will  challenge  the
competitiveness  of the Canadian  industry.  From available  evidence,  at current exchange
rates  and an  open  border with  the  United  States,  both  farmers  and  processors  will  be
competitive  with U.S.  milk and milk product supplies  after a period of adjustment.  This
likely would require the increase in farm size that is occurring already as noted above.  The
main effect on the size distribution of Canadian dairy farms would be to reduce significantly
the number of farms with fewer than 50  cows.  Therefore,  average herd size can be expected
to increase from the current 40-50  cow range into the range of 70-100 cows.  This would
clearly result in an exit from the industry of a number of these small farms (although  some
will also be able to increase  their size),  but aggregate production  levels  could remain the
same or even increase.  If there were a large increase in the value of the Canadian dollar, the
necessary adjustments would be greater and more difficult.
There will also be regional changes in the distribution of production across provinces,
from higher cost provinces  to those with lower costs, but we do not have evidence to predict
which provinces  are most likely to increase their share of  national production.  The last main
point is that there is no  evidence that the domestic  industry will collapse from more open
trade with the United  States as has  been predicted  in some quarters.  With an adjustment
period, both farmers  and processors  are most likely to be competitive with the U.S. industry.
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